

A SINGLE CENTRAL SECURITY AGENCY

There is a bewildering variety of different government departments and agencies conducting security investigations and other activities in observance of the now fifty-plus-year-old failed E.O. 10450 security program. Some of them operate on their own authority, while others operate on the authority delegated by the Office of Personnel Management. Each department or agency is currently responsible for its own security adjudications.

The excessive fragmentation of these very similar functions creates a situation in which each investigative or adjudicative group is organizationally and operationally isolated, although each is performing what should be virtually identical duties from one agency to another. This situation has created a multitude of problem conditions:

Consider the Following:

1. The vast reduction in numbers of investigations which has been recommended will greatly reduce the overall magnitude of both investigations and adjudications; however, given the size of our federal bureaucracy, the drag on cost and efficiency of continuing this de-centralized system will still remain great.
2. Isolated from those performing similar duties in other departments

and agencies, security personnel do not receive the same level of guidance and direction that they would if they were working in a centralized unit.

3. Redundancies and duplications exist not only in personnel, but in management, office space, equipment, files, and other organizational support features, with excess costs running into hundreds of millions of dollars for such things as a) repetitive and unnecessary investigations of the same people; b) accumulation of millions of square feet of extra file space; c) "empires" built up in numerous agencies on the basis of evaluators, administrators, clerical and other support staff; d) travel and living expenses for investigators; and e) office space, furniture, equipment, vehicles, etc.
4. Ideally, when a reinvestigation is necessary because of a job change or for some other reason, the investigator is given the files resulting from any previous investigations and then he begins his field work as of the close of the most recent investigation. In actual fact, however, inter-agency rivalries, as well as the opinion of some agencies that their files and the quality of their services are more secure or sensitive than others, usually prevent complete cooperative interchange of information when needed. As persons transfer from one agency or department to another and a new investigation is made, incomplete or misleading information may be transferred, resulting in either a lower quality product or a duplicate investigation. Sources of information who are at first cooperative are continually being approached for information which they have already supplied concerning the same individuals, resulting in a degradation of the quality of the information as the witnesses become irritated, impatient, or disillusioned. Data already accumulated on file may be lost through dispersal of records. As a result, an individual may be cleared who would otherwise be rejected. Explanatory information might also be accidentally or deliberately withheld, resulting in the unfair rejection of an applicant.
5. At best, the information transferred to a requesting agency consists of the background information developed during the field investigation and that resulting from name checks. Analytical work is virtually never transferred, probably out of fear of outside criticism of the quality of the product. The requesting agency must perform its own analysis of all this data and is generally denied the thinking of the original agency.
6. Persons who should be disqualified are able to stay ahead of the investigative process by changing agencies or departments in advance of the slow-moving and often redundant investigation.
7. Each department or agency maintains its own staff of analysts and

security “experts” who pass on the loyalty of its applicants. This can result in seriously conflicting decisions by two or more agencies concerning the loyalty or suitability of the same applicants, because the adjudicators possess only part of the available information, have different standards of appraisal, have received different levels and quality of training, or have different philosophies as to what is disqualifying or even important. In general, this training is of poor quality anyway, particularly since the persons performing the analysis and passing judgment, and training others to perform this same function, are still coming from the investigative ranks rather than being qualified adjudicators in their own right. Moreover, in many cases adjudicators are not even required to attend the training.

8. Under a decentralized system, judgments may often be influenced by the pressure to fill a vacancy, familiarity or friendship with the applicant (especially at the upper levels of a department or agency), variations in political or social beliefs of the evaluators and decision-makers, and different degrees of knowledge and competency in the task of evaluation and the application of standards to the facts.
9. The existence of personal and perhaps derogatory information on people which is accessible to personnel in the same agency who may perhaps be acquainted with the individual constitutes a real potential for violation of privacy.
10. The fear that Congress, the media, or the public may learn that the U.S. government security system has failed to keep out dangerous elements sometimes results in agencies permitting persons known to be disloyal to resign or transfer in order to obtain other government employment. This also results in agency refusals to make available all the information they may have on those being investigated by other employment offices.
11. The built-in inefficiencies of the current system prevent the fulfillment of the security mission in spite of the scores of millions spent annually to do this. We need think only of the enormous backlog in the required reinvestigations of Defense Department employees. Nevertheless the system grinds on ineffectively.
12. Without a single, guiding unifying center, it is impossible to provide effective guidance and direction to government security personnel. Instead they are overly influenced by, if not totally subservient to, the bureaucracy of the agency or department where they are located. Guidance by the Office of Personnel Management of the government security personnel of the agencies under its authority is remote and ineffective. Meanwhile agencies not under its authority, such as the DoD, FBI and the CIA, go off on their own anyway, often basing very different judgments on similar or identical data.

The government is unable to benefit from the experience and know-how of an organization of trained and experienced security investigators and evaluators. Even when committees are found to study and advise on particular issues, different agencies decide for themselves whether they will or will not implement each recommendation, resulting in a failed study or a hodgepodge of procedures among agencies.

13. The potential for abuse, as well as deficient performance, is much greater in a situation in which each security office or security investigative analysis group operates as an autonomous unit loosely supervised, if at all, from outside that agency or department. A direct and uniform line of management, supervision, and control would minimize the untoward independence and power which frequently spawns abuse by security units.
14. As a smaller group within a large agency or department, the security function is typically outside the main managerial channels and without the high-level influence within the organization which is necessary to get the job done and insure compliance both with its security decisions and with the organization-wide procedures it may attempt to put in place.
15. Greater security effectiveness made in this book is substantially more difficult to implement in the present environment of dispersed and fragmented security authority. The present system almost guarantees that security will not be taken with much seriousness in agencies or departments where it has low priority, both in terms of agency budgets and prestige and in terms of agency policies and priorities.
16. A decentralized system diminishes the capacity and will of the government to establish and apply standards of conduct, character, morality, and integrity in clearance decisions. Individual agencies are more susceptible to vocal abuse and threat from the media, politicians, and the many and varied activists who agitate on this subject and individuals agencies are thereby more easily dissuaded from denying clearances or employment to persons who fail to meet the standards.
17. Standards of character, conduct, and morality are likewise diluted because of fear of attack by the media or by the activists of various causes. By contrast, a single, central, unified security authority would provide a firm, independent, and consistent application of established standards to the decisions made regarding security clearances.

The cumulative effect here is to indicate the need for a single, central government security agency to carry out the U.S. government's

security function. Virtually all of these flaws could be eliminated by the creation and effective direction of such an entity.

This Central Security Agency would be responsible for performing all security investigations and for adjudicating the results. It would have government-wide responsibility for granting or withholding security clearances. It would also be responsible for developing and disseminating government-wide security policies and procedures.

Although putting in place and implementing many of these security policies and procedures would necessarily be the responsibility of the line management in the individual departments and agencies, the Central Security Agency should have inspection and oversight responsibilities and should also conduct audits to measure the effectiveness of the efforts of department and agency management in security matters and to ensure uniform compliance throughout the government. The Agency would also identify and help respond to specific security deficiencies identified within other agencies and departments. It would provide a single, unified voice before Congress and the public in connection with the U.S. Government security system generally.

The centralization of all security functions in a single Central Security Agency would also make possible the creation of a well-trained and highly motivated corps of security specialists in a position to serve the entire U.S. government. It would save many millions of dollars annually. These savings could be achieved in many ways, but specifically by consolidating all government security records and processes in a single location under a single authority. All other security activities would similarly be performed on a centralized basis: application processing, investigations, record checks, polygraph tests, security hearings, updates, adjudications, issuance of clearances or denials, and hearings and appeals. Because of the ability of a centralized agency to focus its resources, the improvements in security specialist qualifications, control, training, consistency, and other performance measurements would be immense. The reductions in the size of the work force, with attendant reductions in salary, retirement and other benefits, travel, and other costs would also be immense.

The validity of the conclusions set forth in this book are confirmed over and over again by the various commissions and committees which have examined the quality and performance of various aspects of the government's security program, frequently after a devastating and expensive act of revealed treason or espionage.

The study results uniformly recommend patching one or another of

the many facets of the program, but without ever addressing the fundamental premises upon which the overall program is based.

Typically, “fix-it” nostrums are recommended, although a number of recommendations have been positive and constructive as we have noted, and certain recommendations have ascribed cost savings ranging up to the hundreds of millions of dollars.

We are deliberately refraining from putting a specific dollar amount on the savings to be realized by the adoption of a total approach to security; however, stated categorically, the sums will be massive. Dollar specifics must await the shape and outline of the program to be designed. The Single Security Agency concept, if adopted, along with the adoption of the recommendation to rely upon other measures than full field investigations for the vast number of clearances, will produce such savings over a ten-year period as to refund to the American taxpayers much of the treasure lost through the treason and treachery of the traitors who have paraded through our last half century of history.

The need for coordination and control of the security function is finally beginning to be recognized and as a result of several commissioned studies, some elementary recommendations have been proposed.

An office has been recommended that would develop and promulgate consistent policies, documents and procedures. The Information Security Oversight Office is already performing some coordination and evaluation functions although they are primarily related to declassification of information and the development of security awareness manuals. However, these actions represent only a fraction of the function and controls of a single security agency.

In early March 1992, Senator David Boren of Oklahoma, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, proposed a set of far-reaching, even sweeping reforms of the currently dispersed and fragmented U.S. intelligence and counter-intelligence functions. Senator Boren’s proposal called for the creation of an overall “intelligence Czar” with control over both domestic and foreign counter-intelligence, that is, with control over activities currently divided among the CIA, FBI, NSA, DoD, and some other agencies. The director of the CIA is already by law the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but as a practical matter he has had control only over the CIA. The Boren proposal would finally bring together many of the activities originally envisaged when the function of Director of Central Intelligence was first set up after World War II, growing out of the old Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Although the proposal outlined here for a single Central Security Agency calls for a

single, separate and distinct agency, performing *all* professional support functions, it is consistent with the Boren proposal and for many of the same reasons.

Although there are compelling arguments in favor of unifying related intelligence functions in the manner proposed, it is probably inevitable that the Department of Defense and others will immediately oppose the proposal. Their “empires” would be threatened. The interests of the country, however, almost certainly require that we go beyond the preservation of such established bureaucracies.

Similarly, opposition to the idea of a single Central Security Agency is probably to be expected from those agencies or entities whose current functions would be affected. Their responses may all be anticipated: “We’re doing that already.” “It won’t help.” “We tried that and it didn’t work.” “We are different.” And so on.

But the real issue here, as we have been able to see at length, is that the current security system is not working. It has never worked; nor will it ever work. But a single Central Security Agency, implementing the recommendations contained in this book, can be highly effective.

DESCRIPTION AND FUNCTIONS OF A SINGLE CENTRAL SECURITY AGENCY

In order to correct the manifold deficiencies in the current U.S. government security system, and provide the United States with effective protection against those who would compromise the country’s vital secrets and security, the following proposals are offered which, taken together, would amount to the creation of a single Central Security Agency for the United States.

1. A commission should be created under the Executive Office of the President, with ex officio representation from Congress, in order to develop standards for the suitability and loyalty of U.S. government employees; these standards should be framed in such a way that judgments could be made about whether or not to grant security clearances for government employment in accordance with them, recognizing that government employees are not by virtue of their employment entitled as a matter of right to access classified security data.
2. An Agency of the executive branch of the government should be created, to be headed by three commissioners, no more than two of whom could be members of the same political party. The ap-

pointments of these three commissioners would be for life, subject to the confirmation of the Senate. This Agency, to be called the Central Security Agency, should be made responsible by statute for the following governmental functions:

- Determining all situations where security investigations are required and the scope of such investigations and conducting all investigations of persons, federal employees and others, who require access to classified data by virtue of the positions they hold or will be holding.
 - Developing security reference files and related information on all government employees and applicants and maintaining such files and records on a permanent basis.
 - Analyzing all the information collected or acquired on the individuals investigated and making judgments about their loyalty and suitability to receive security clearances for access to classified information on the basis of standards to be developed by the commission described in item #1 above.
3. The Agency should have the authority to select and hire such individuals as it deems necessary and qualified to carry out the duties and functions assigned to it, and should develop and prescribe the qualifying standards for such employees.
 4. The Agency should conduct studies, audits, and inquiries concerning the security policies and procedures of all other government departments and agencies, as well as contract companies in the private sector, which have or use classified government material for any purpose; and should specifically determine whether the physical security measures of such departments, agencies, or companies are adequate and sufficient for the protection of the classified material in the custody of these organizations, prescribing what measures are required, in accordance with standards to be established by the Agency itself.
 5. The Agency should have the authority to grant or deny security clearances for U.S. government employment; to rescind the security clearance of any employee it deems unsuitable; to deny to any government agency or department or company access to or retention of classified security data if it determines that the organization has violated, or is likely to violate, the established standards for the protection of such data, or is failing to administer its program of physical security in a manner which will insure the protection of the classified material for which it is responsible.
 6. The Agency should assume control and responsibility over all files, records, reports of investigation, and information pertaining to the security and suitability of all federal employees and employees in

- the private sector who have been cleared for access to classified material, or on whom a case is in existence or pending.
7. The Agency should receive and maintain records of organizations and individuals in matters where loyalty, suitability, or related matters may provide pertinent data necessary in judging the suitability and security and loyalty of applicants and employees who will come within the purview of the Agency. Such records should include criminal records, although the Agency will have the right of access to such data in the possession of the FBI by requesting a search of the Bureau's records, as well as of the records of police departments throughout the country and abroad and of intelligence and security agencies.
 8. The Agency should have subpoena power, as well as the power of putting people under oath, and of holding quasi-judicial hearings, and pursuing other such appropriate procedures, under law and accepted judicial practice, in order to be able to arrive at the truth of those matters that properly and legally come before it.
 9. The Agency's central headquarters should be in Washington, D.C., but it should be authorized to establish such regional offices as may be required for the efficient performance of its responsibilities.
 10. The Agency should receive all records pertaining to prior, or current, cases of treason, espionage, loss or theft or destruction of classified data, and all cases involving breaches of government security, including infractions and violations, whether inadvertent or deliberate. It should be authorized to require that government agencies and departments provide it with information, statistics, and records in connection with their physical security performances and their systems of document and logging control, and it should have similar authority with regard to companies in the private sector which are in possession of classified data as a result of federal government contracts.
 11. The Agency should make such reports to the president and Congress as required by law, both at the outset of its activities, and on a continuing basis as necessary. The reports will include, but need not be limited to, the numbers of security investigations conducted; the results of these investigations, particularly with regard to the numbers of security clearances granted or denied; the numbers of security breaches which have occurred throughout the government and the nature of the corrective action taken with regard to them; the nature and type of such breaches, with an estimate of the harm, if any, arising from them; the number of treasonable or seditious acts discovered and the nature of the action taken with respect to them; the incidence of loss, theft, or destruction of classified docu-

ments including pertinent information on the perpetrators of such actions; and the disciplinary actions taken for security violations and other failures and deficiencies.

12. To the extent that it is consistent with national security, the Agency should make public the pertinent facts contained in the reports to be prepared in accordance with item #11 above.

ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF A SINGLE CENTRAL SECURITY AGENCY

The arguments for a single Central Security Agency are persuasive, while the arguments for maintaining our current futile and unworkable security system are negligible, and usually self-serving. In order for this or any innovative idea to become a reality, however, there must be astute leadership in its support. Its basic concepts must be embodied in viable legislation, then survive the attacks that will no doubt be launched against it.

It must be assumed that the idea of a single Central Security Agency will be opposed by the present security establishment, most of whose current members will perceive their own self-interest to reside in the status quo of existing, unsupervised security fiefdoms in the various departments and agencies.

The concept of one centralized agency handling the overall security needs of the U.S. government is not a recent development. Its benefits in terms of cost savings, efficiency, increased competence of security practitioners, and marked reduction in duplication of effort were recognized by this author in 1947. Since that time, the basic concept has been advocated more than once by different specialists or legislators, and has even been included in House and Senate bills which the author, working with Congressional staff, succeeded in having introduced. Unfortunately, these bills were never passed into law. Each effort to enact the concept into law, lacking sufficient support, fell victim either to the rivalries or perceived self-interest of existing agencies.

As an appropriate conclusion, a brief account of some of my own experiences in designing and promoting the concept of a single Central Security Agency may be interesting and instructive.

The Conception (1947)

In 1947, while employed at the Central Intelligence Agency, then still known as the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), I served as Chief of

the Liaison Division in the Office of Security and Inspection. My role included responsibility for developing and implementing procedures for CIG access to the security and intelligence files of other agencies which could be used by CIG in investigating and assessing the security worthiness of its job applicants and employees.

As a result of earlier investigative experience with the Civil Service Commission, the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps, and the OSS under General Donovan at the Nuremberg trials, I came to the realization that, whereas there was an immense amount of intelligence data in existence, it was distributed among many organizations. Further, although there did exist varying degrees of cooperation among the intelligence-gathering and security entities, they mostly operated as competitive businesses, with each organization primarily concerned with its own advancement and only secondarily with the protection of the government's interests. The Office of Naval Intelligence, the Civil Service Commission, the Army MI, the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate Internal Affairs Committee, and later the OSI (when the Air Force became a separate arm) all tended to share the information they had with other agencies. The FBI, however, restricted its files and insisted on assembling a "prepared" product for any other agency requesting security or investigative information or data.

Numerous agencies were all engaged in their own investigations. For example, in the early days of my career as a federal employee, I was investigated by no less than five government agencies including the Civil Service Commission, the Department of State, the FBI, the Military Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army, and the CIA, each for separate, but related, jobs in the field of security and intelligence.

When it is recognized that integral to a full field investigation is a requirement to fan out across the same geographical territory where the applicant has been or lived in order to verify statements on the application concerning education, employment, police records, residences, and neighbors, and to follow up on any leads which might have arisen in the course of the investigation, it quickly becomes apparent that, because of overlap and duplication, such an investigation requires a substantial and wholly unnecessary investment in time, money, and personnel.

In my investigating days I very quickly recognized that, for example, once I had verified the high school and college records of an applicant and obtained the appropriate transcripts, it would be wasteful for another government investigator to go out subsequently looking for the same information, once, twice, or even more. Yet, when a government

employee was transferred from one agency to another and needed to be cleared by the second agency, the only information shared between the two agencies was the level of clearance granted to the individual. Background information on the individual was not shared. It became apparent that what was at stake in sharing or not sharing this background information was not so much the information itself as it was the question of the judgment or evaluation of this security information made by an agency when granting or withholding a security clearance. Generally neither the background investigation nor the security appraisal was shared.

Compounding the wastefulness and inadequacy of the system was another agency practice of always retaining its own file on the individual. Thus, when employees transferred from one department or agency to another, not only was a new security clearance required, a new security investigation was required; whereas by the simple act of transferring the security file with the employee, all that would have been required would have been an update of an investigation, not a complete new investigation. However, bureaucratic arteriosclerosis would not permit logic to function.

Further adding to the wastefulness and confusion was the general refusal of agencies to accept the results of another agency's previous security judgment. This is akin to a medical doctor refusing to consider results of a the blood test, EKG, or other tests by a doctor who has recently seen the same patient. Agencies accepting transferred employees insisted on making their own judgment on an employee's suitability before granting security clearance. They would only do so after a new investigation had been conducted, verifying all the same information previously gathered regarding the applicant's birth, education, employment, residence, reputation with his neighbors, etc.

Historically, under the law, the Civil Service Commission was charged with announcing and holding examinations for positions in the federal service. The Commission rated the applicants who took the examinations and placed them on registers based upon their scores. Thereafter, agencies and departments communicated to the Commission their needs for employees and certificates of eligibles from the registers of qualified persons were sent to the agency requesters who were required to select from among those shown on the certificates. The system worked very well over the years and held to a minimum the inevitable abuses arising from efforts to favor friends and also from the nepotism which had plagued the federal service prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act.

I saw a similar opportunity: the Civil Service Commission could conduct all the security investigations, as the Commission had done back

in the 1930s and the early 1940s before the magnitude of the wartime federal build-up had made it impossible to keep up with the workload. My basic idea provided for an independent Commission, not the employing agency, to conduct the background inquiries on applicants or employees and evaluate it, to examine the security, loyalty, integrity, and suitability of the candidate in the light of the requirements, and determine where a security clearance was specifically required by the nature of the position and either to issue or deny the clearance. The Commission would both evaluate the data and issue or deny clearances of the basis of applicable standards. I sketched out the outlines of the system that has been laid out earlier in this chapter.

Senator Taft and the Hoover Commission

The CIG, like the FBI, had created its own investigative staff. It made its own analysis of the data gathered, and then made its own judgments on the suitability and loyalty of the employee or applicant. I recognized that there was no way even my own agency was going to accept any infringement on its own “right” to perform all these functions. Nor would the Civil Service Commission undertake to challenge all of the other powerful departments and agencies on the issue.

At that time one of the dominant figures in Congress was Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, then known as “Mr. Republican.” This Ohio senator was noted for many qualities. He was utterly honest, always doing the right thing as he saw it regardless of the consequences, and sometimes committing colossal blunders by saying something, even though it might be true, at the wrong or inappropriate time. I was a great admirer of Senator Taft.

I was determined to put my concept of a single Central Security Agency before him. I actually had a note sent out to Senator Taft on the floor of the Senate via a page; when the senator came off the floor in response to the note, I explained my concept. The senator was clearly interested, most gracious and encouraging. He observed that the concept seemed to him rational, economically beneficial, and administratively sound. He concluded that the proposal was one which merited the attention of the Hoover Commission which was then examining the administrative performance of the executive branch of the government. He told me to meet with the Executive Director of the Hoover Commission, a Mr. Brassor, with authorization to state that the referral included his personal request for consideration of my idea.

Mr. Brassor was a long-time employee of the Civil Service Com-

mission, and remained one while he was directing the work of the Hoover Commission. My interview with him was far from a smashing success. He himself was an accomplished bureaucrat, and he had brought his bureaucratic skills with him to the Hoover Commission. He avoided any real action, regardless of the problem. At the same time, he was not about to deliver any negative judgment, considering Senator Taft's endorsement of the idea. He resolved this tough issue by passing it to the Civil Service Commission's congressional liaison.

In those days, the Civil Service Commission maintained its liaison with Congress through the instrumentality of Robert L. Bailey, who was a long-time veteran of the Federal Service and highly skilled in the political game. I prepared a written description of my concept in response to Bailey's request (see Appendix H), and, over the course of several years, he tried to promote the idea with the Congress. He made some progress and the idea acquired some sympathy on Capitol Hill, but Bailey's retirement from the federal service effectively meant that the whole thing was left hanging without ever getting enacted into law.

Another Lost Opportunity

As we have seen, the early 1950s was a period when it became impossible to keep the lid on the dramatic espionage successes of the Soviet Union in penetrating our government. Real security breakdowns and disasters were revealed and genuine Soviet agents were shown to have been at work for years penetrating our government at the highest levels while serving the interests of a foreign power. In the ferment and fury which resulted, the Administration and Congress completely lost sight of how abysmally our own security system had failed. With all the focus on the revelations concerning spies and other secret goings-on, no serious effort was made to look at the real reasons why it all was permitted to happen.

The questions that badly needed addressing was how our security system had failed and what needed to be done to fix it. But these questions were not addressed and hence they were not answered. An important opportunity was lost.

We also lost uncountable millions, not to speak of lives, in the protracted Cold War that followed—not to speak of the hot wars in Korea and Vietnam and numerous skirmishes in other trouble spots stirred up by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other regimes. The most powerful nation on earth had been diminished while its most formidable

opponent, the Soviet Union, built much of its strength on our security failures.

Meanwhile bitter accusations and hatreds divided America, especially at our leadership levels in the media, the churches, academia, labor, entertainment, and political life over charges of disloyalty, pro-Communism, McCarthyism and related issues. The resulting confusion helped prevent any reasoned, objective, deliberate approach to the issues of loyalty and security. As a result no sound security system emerged for the protection of our secrets and of our country.

Instead politically motivated and sensational accusations of disloyalty were made, as were declarations of intention couched in strong words. But these proved to be mostly for show, to “clean all the spies and security risks out of government.” At the same time, however, since little or no real thought had been given to what the real problems were, the security system that was put in place at that time left a great deal to be desired. With security firmly under the influence of the FBI and FBI alumni by then, no fundamental institutional change or improvement had a chance.

There was, however, one change that occurred at that time that offered the opportunity to move towards a single central security agency. Under Executive Order 10450, J. Edgar’s Hoover’s FBI had responsibility for virtually all non-CIA security investigations. Concerned that the image of the FBI might change from that of the valiant crime-and spy-fighting organization to that of simple investigative agency, Hoover encouraged the transfer of this security investigative function to the Civil Service Commission. Once this transfer was effected, however, Mr. Kimball Johnson, chief of the CSC’s Investigation Division—a fine government official and very dear friend—decided to delegate out as much of this investigative responsibility as possible because he felt he could not expand the number of CSC investigators rapidly enough to cover the needs of all the federal departments and agencies needing security investigations conducted.

Thus, the Departments of State, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, as well as certain other sensitive agencies, were given by delegation of authority the responsibility for performing their own security investigations and adjudications using procedures approved by the CSC. The FBI and CIA continued to perform their own investigations. *All* of the departments and agencies continued to perform their own security adjudications. This act of expediency by the CSC—delegating the investigative author-

ity—coupled with its failure to consolidate the adjudication process—ended all realistic hopes for a centralized security agency at that time.

Senator Olin Johnston

During and after the McCarthy era, I continued to make various attempts to better inform Congress about security.

One committee in Congress which had a legitimate interest in the ensurance of loyalty and suitability of government employees, the legitimate protection of their civil rights, and the quality of executive branch security programs was the old Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

In a Senate then controlled by the Republicans, the ranking minority member was Senator Olin Johnston, a Democrat from South Carolina, who was considered almost a stereotype of the Southern senator of the day. He had hardly any conception of the real issues involved. Nor was it usually possible to explain things to him. However, the chief minority clerk for this Senate committee, William T. Brawley, was as competent and sophisticated as Senator Johnston was inadequate and confused. Himself politically ambitious and very astute, Brawley, who later became Deputy Postmaster General under Eisenhower, was very receptive to my proposal for a single Central Security Agency, and he was willing to try to push it. He immediately saw the relevance of the issue to the role and responsibilities of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

Over a period of some two years, many discussions took place and numerous documents were drafted, all aimed at selling the basic concept to key Committee members. Finally, a Senate Bill (S. 2399) was drafted laying out the statutory requirements for a single Central Security Agency, and introduced into the Senate with the support of Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois and a number of other senators. It would have eliminated all the waste, fraud, duplications, expense, abuses, and weaknesses of the U.S. government security system then in place—and still in place. A companion bill was also introduced into the House of Representatives with strong sponsorship. Unfortunately, the bills died in committee because the vested interests of the existing investigative agencies proved stronger than the bills' sponsorship.

JFK: The Morse Plan, “I want to do something on it.”

During the Kennedy-Nixon presidential campaign in 1960, Vice President Nixon had the benefit of the boundless resources of the execu-

tive branch to provide him with security services and protection. Senator Kennedy, on the other hand, although his Senate office was directly across the hall in the Senate Office Building from the Vice President's, enjoyed no such luxuries. Since their presidential contest was fought in an era prior to the tragic assassination of President Kennedy himself, the nation at that time had not focused on the need for the protection of its presidential candidates, who in those days received no Secret Service protection. The vice president was thus better prepared for any possible violent actions against him, as he was better prepared against any "dirty tricks" or other intrusions; he had the whole federal government at his disposal.

Senator Kennedy, as a presidential candidate, did have a police escort assigned to him detailed from the Washington Metropolitan Police Department. A long-time close personal friend, Detective Sergeant James Roche, was the key man on that escort. A veteran of many years on the force, he was not only capable and fearless, but he had an Irish personality and humor which delighted the Senator from Massachusetts.

I received a call from Sgt. Roche near the beginning of the campaign asking me to provide certain specialized security services to Senator Kennedy, including technical assistance both at his Senate office and at his home in Georgetown. As a result of providing these security services, I came to know well Evelyn Lincoln, Kennedy's long-time loyal and competent secretary. I responded to Mrs. Lincoln's direct requests for security assistance on a number of occasions. Of course the day the Massachusetts Senator defeated Nixon and became the President-elect, the Secret Service, and other federal agencies very quickly and properly took over all functions having anything to do with his security.

Nevertheless, our friendship with Evelyn and Harold ("Abe") Lincoln grew, and, in the course of my dealings with Mrs. Lincoln, I had occasion to discuss various government operations with her on more numerous occasions. At some point in our discussions the concept of a single Central Security Agency came up and I described my ideas on this subject to her. I explained the advantages and benefits of the proposed system to her, as well as pointing out the deficiencies of the security system we had in place. Evelyn was a very able and intelligent person with extensive experience in the Federal Service and quickly recognized the merits of the proposal. She was particularly impressed by my concern that the program respect the legitimate rights of government employees while preventing and identifying subversive activity. She indi-

cated that this particular emphasis reflected a deep personal commitment on the part of President Kennedy himself. Finally, there was the enormous cost savings to be realized.

At the request of the Personal Secretary to the President, then, I was pleased to prepare an indepth assessment of the whole concept and a description of how the system based upon it would function. I sent all this material to Mrs. Lincoln under a cover letter dated October 17, 1963. We were optimistic over the prospects of the idea.

This material was passed to the President. What ensued can best be described in the words of Evelyn Lincoln in response to my request to her to confirm the events in question:

I have been delighted to read my diary which I wrote during that time and as a result I am submitting the following explanation to you:

As was my custom, papers that needed the President's attention were placed in a file box on the left-hand corner of my desk. The President would come out to my office and read those papers some time during the day.

The early part of November 1963, I placed the letter written to the President by George P. Morse recommending the establishment of an Agency and a program to handle all investigations and clearances at a central level and to eliminate the various investigative and clearance organizations which were scattered throughout the Executive Branch in that box.

Each day thereafter the President would look at this letter and say, 'I will read this at a later date.'

He was scheduled to go to Elkton, Maryland, to participate in the dedication of a new turnpike in Delaware and Maryland—from there to New York—and thence to Palm Beach, Tampa, and Miami, Florida. He asked me to put Mr. Morse's letter in his black brief case so that he might read it during his trip.

We returned to Washington the evening of November 18. The next morning the papers he had in his brief case were delivered to my office and with them was Mr. Morse's letter, with the notation in the corner 'Remind me.' This I did and he said, 'Yes, remind me to bring this letter to the attention of the Cabinet members because I want to do something about it.'

Two days later he flew off to Texas.

And so, the great tragedy of President Kennedy's death which

brought the demise of many hopes and dreams, also killed the best opportunity for an effective security system for America.

Perhaps another leader of vision can revive our dream for stronger and better security for our great country.

